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U.S. Immigration Policy 
What Next?
Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
Columbia University
United States immigration policy stands at the crossroads.
We have had a remarkable and passionate debate. The 
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy 
under Father Hesburgh's chairmanship was established in 
October 1978 in response to growing concerns that had 
already entered the public policy domain. It led, in turn, to 
the introduction of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill into the House. 
After nearly three years of tortuous legislative efforts to 
enact it into law, Simpson-Mazzoli died in conference at the 
end of the 98th Congress. By that time, the bill was already 
weighed under by numerous compromises from its original 
version, reflecting the exigencies of the legislative process 
that prompted the witticism that there are two things you did 
not want to see made: laws and sausage.
If we keep in view the facts that prominent intellectuals 
and editorial writers threw their support behind Simpson- 
Mazzoli, that the bill came very close to passage, that pas 
sions have been aroused and lobbies activated, it is not sur 
prising that the Congress has witnessed renewed efforts at 
immigration legislation. In fact, fears that Simpson-Mazzoli 
would rise again from its ashes led to early efforts by its op 
ponents in the 99th Congress at heading off this threat. 
Thus, Congressman Roybal had introduced a pre-emptive 
Bill HR 30 and Congressman Garcia held fresh hearings on
ill
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immigration policy before his Subcommittee on Census and 
Population, reflecting Hispanic concerns. Meanwhile, 
Messrs. Simpson and Mazzoli have parted company and 
each has sponsored new legislation aimed at immigration 
control, with Senator Simpson teaming up now with Con 
gressman Rodino this time around.
We need therefore to address, as clearly as we can, the 
question: where do we turn at this juncture? You might be 
tempted to dismiss this question on the cynical ground that 
the intense arguments of the last few years and the 
strangeness of the coalitions that formed around Simpson- 
Mazzoli suggest that matters have gone beyond enlightened 
analysis. Or you may fear that by now nothing worthwhile 
could have been left unsaid. I hope to convince you, 
however, that a fresh approach can indeed be proposed. And 
I trust that you will share my optimism that rational 
discourse has its role to play in every public policy debate, no 
matter how contentious the issue in question.
To devise an appropriate policy, we must define desirable 
objectives and suitable policy instruments to achieve those 
objectives. As I shall argue presently, both the Select Com 
mission and the Simpson-Mazzoli proponents shared essen 
tially two popular objectives (i.e., reducing the flow of illegal 
immigrants and rescuing these and the earlier stock of il 
legals from an underclass status) and had two less popular 
policy instruments (i.e., the employer sanctions and the 
amnesty program) to achieve them. I shall also argue that, 
ironically, these two policy instruments may be expected to 
produce the opposite results from those desired, reminding 
me of Max Weber's celebrated remark about the "paradox 
of unanticipated consequences." And I shall propose that we 
now think of a wholly different approach to achieving the 
Simpson-Mazzoli objectives. 1
U.S. Immigration Policy 113
But, before I do that, I do wish to consider at the outset 
why immigration has come to be regarded as a major public 
policy question. A delineation, and then a dispassionate ex 
amination, of the concerns that have elevated immigration 
reform to our attention will serve to provide me with an 
assessment of the worthwhileness of the Simpson-Mazzoli 
objectives and hence to place my changed policy approach to 
them into proper context.
A Litany of Concerns
The most compelling aspect of the immigration situation 
today is that we have a significant amount of illegal immigra 
tion. The concerns of reasonable commentators, even if the 
conjectures on which they proceed are often unreasonable, 
proceed from this central fact. And indeed, the illegality of 
the immigration inflow, not the total legal numbers admitted 
by us annually, occupies the center of the stage. Why?
First, it raises the specter of vast inflows from a seething 
mass of humanity. Imagine becoming part of Greater Mex 
ico, or worse still, part of Greater Caribbean and Central 
America as well! The large numbers being bandied about on 
the "undocumented" aliens, the euphemism for illegal im 
migrants, have helped this alarmist perception. Unless we 
"regain control of our borders," we will be swamped. The 
faintly ridiculous zero population growth (ZPG) movement, 
which seeks to freeze population levels, has derived par 
ticular solace, and much mileage, from this cataclysmic 
scenario which I shall presently argue to be exaggerated.
Second, the illegality raises fear that it will breed more il 
legality in turn. This perception, while patently false, has 
been accentuated by the accounts of the Mariel Cuban im 
migrants' problems in Florida.
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Third, closely tied to illegality is the question of ethnicity. 
Many of the illegal immigrants are, naturally, Hispanics who 
can and do simply walk across the Rio Grande. Unlike in the 
immigration debates which attended the first enactment of 
our national immigration legislation in 1921, racist 
arguments simply will not be tolerated today. However, the 
heavy bias of the illegal influx in favor of Hispanics has rais 
ed more fear of encroachment by a second language more 
than by a different culture. Today, the iron fist of a domi 
nant Anglo-Saxon culture that tended to produce a 
homogeneous, assimilated mass of second-generation 
children who embraced the English language unquestioning- 
ly is no longer in evidence. The growing emphasis on ethnic 
diversity, and indeed pride therein, militates against the 
homogenization process. In this new cultural context, the 
Hispanic domination of the illegal influx, with threat of 
many more to come, creates serious concerns. 2
Fourth, illegality of the influx has created the apprehen 
sion that a finely tuned policy of immigration, delicately 
balancing costs and benefits to us through careful selection 
of numbers and composition, is being undermined by an un 
controlled inflow that must therefore, prima facie, be harm 
ful to us. This concern was especially acute during the pre- 
recovery slump when it was feared that a tough unemploy 
ment situation was being worsened by the "peso refugees'*: 
Hispanics moving north in search of jobs as the developing 
countries of Latin America, especially Mexico, got mired in 
the slump and drowned in their debt. 3 But the concern was 
also acute among some that illegals would prove to be a net 
burden on the fiscal system, though studies commissioned by 
the Hesburgh Commission found little support for this 
presupposition.
Fifth, and finally, illegal immigration has created a 
humanitarian issue. The illegal aliens represent an
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underclass, often subsisting better than where they came 
from, but evidently in conditions and with civil rights that, 
because of fear of seizure and deportation, are simply not 
asserted enough to be a practical reality. You may have 
heard the story of the Jewish couple who, on complimenting 
the illegal-immigrant Chinese waiter in a Brooklyn Szechwan 
restaurant for speaking tolerable Yiddish, found the 
manager rushing up to them and remonstrating: "Hush, he 
thinks he is learning English!" It is widely believed that con 
cern with this altruistic aspect of the immigration situation, 
rather than the more narrowly self-serving arguments I have 
detailed, led former Secretary of Labor, Ray Marshall, to 
persuade President Carter to adopt immigration reform as 
an important goal of his administration. Out of these con 
cerns came the two principal objectives of the Select Com 
mission and Simpson-Mazzoli. One was simply to restrict 
immigration, or rather the illegal component. The other was 
to ameliorate the deplorable conditions in which the 
underclass of illegal immigrants found itself.
Facts and Realities
I should emphasize immediately that the perception that 
we are being flooded by unusually large numbers of im 
migrants is not based on facts. For instance, legal immigra 
tion during 1950-1970, according to U.S. Bureau of Census 
data, has averaged less than half of the peak level during 
1900-1909! If adjustment is made for the rise in population, 
the reduction in legal immigration flows is even more strik 
ing. Immigrant inflows as a percent of resident U.S. popula 
tion has in fact fluctuated between less than 0.1 percent dur 
ing the war years to roughly 0.2 percent during 1950-1980, 
with a peak of 0.35 percent during 1980 when the absolute 
immigration inflow was just under 800,000. If adjustment is 
made further for emigration a phenomenon that partly 
reflects a life-cycle return of the immigrants, and which has
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been there since the 19th century the figures of net im 
migration fall somewhat further below the absolute levels of 
roughly 400,000 on average through the 1970s.
Yet another striking fact, brought to our attention by 
Kingsley Davis, is that the proportion of foreign-born to 
total population in the U.S. has been falling steadily since 
1910 until it was less than 5 percent in 1970, whereas it has 
risen in recent history in many countries including Australia, 
Switzerland, France and Sweden and, in fact, exceeds hand 
somely our 1970 proportion in these countries plus others 
such as Canada and New Zealand. For a country built on im 
migration, these facts suggest that our legal immigration 
policy has not been lax or overly generous in any persuasive 
sense.
The illegal inflow does impact on this argument, since our 
susceptibility to it is considered generally to be greater than 
in many of these countries, with the exception of France. But 
not by any means as much as the early claims in the range of 
8 to 12 million suggested by Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS). These estimates, unfounded as they were, pro 
fited from a law I have formulated: that any statistics will 
win against no statistics. And these numbers came to be 
widely circulated. Studies prompted by the Select Commis 
sion have now dispelled the myths they created. 4 It appears 
that, in the late 1970s, the stock of illegal residents is likely to 
have been between 3.5 and 6 million not more. That means 
that the flow is likely to have been substantially less, for the 
border has been a porous sieve for quite some time.
My own judgment, given these numbers, is that immigra 
tion reform arguments based on immigration being "too 
large" are implausible. Any economist familiar with the 
theories of the consequences of immigration must admit to a 
complex of positive and negative effects. With the immigra 
tion flows being such small proportions of the population
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and the workforce, the net economic gains or losses (if any) 
from these levels of immigration must shrink into relative in 
significance.
I would be tempted to conclude therefore, that, at least as 
far as the economic effects of the present immigration levels 
are concerned, there should not be cause for alarm. That im 
migration, therefore, may be treated as a phenomenon 
rather than a problem. In fact, if one looks not merely at the 
short-term effects of the current recovery but also at 
demographic trends that project a labor shortage by the early 
decades of the next century, it is possible to contemplate with 
greater equanimity the fearful projections of growing 
streams of new immigrants from the Caribbean and Latin 
American countries, propelled to us by distress, disruption 
or simply desire.
No one can, however, firmly refute the grim scenarios. 
Doubtless, Puerto Ricans have not flooded the U.S., empty 
ing their land. Italians have not moved en masse to West 
Germany from the poverty of the south, despite freedom of 
movement in the European Community. Wages are typically 
not equalized, even within the same country, by migration. 
Custom, commitment, risk-aversion, hope, family, attach 
ment to land, financial incapacity to move: these and other 
economic and social factors shape and constrain outmigra- 
tion to the more prosperous areas. But large movements do 
occur. Responsible immigration policy cannot be predicated 
on the most promising scenarios. As the financier Felix 
Rohatyn would put it, this would be like "betting the com 
pany."
The Two Objectives
I therefore accept, as a reasonable policy objective, the 
premise that we should bring illegal immigration under con 
trol.
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As I have stressed already, the other Simpson-Mazzoli ob 
jective, which I happen to share with greater enthusiasm, is a 
social and moral one. The illegal aliens who get in, willy- 
nilly, past the door are indeed, despite Brusati's poignant 
Bread and Chocolate, substantially better off than where 
they come from. But they are at the bottom of our social and 
economic hierarchy, living in conditions that are significant 
ly below what our moral standards require. If they live 
abroad in appalling conditions, exploited and destitute, 
distance places them beyond our view and responsibility. But 
in our midst, even though illegally, their condition offends 
our moral sensibility. The condition of the underclass cannot 
be ignored by a civilized society, certainly not by ours. 5
The Simpson-Mazzoli Policy Instruments
The approach embodied in Simpson-Mazzoli, and indeed 
originating in the recommendations of the Select Commis 
sion, offered two policies to address these two objectives. 
Both policies, employer sanctions and an amnesty, were far 
less popular than the two objectives. For example, compell 
ing objections to employer sanctions were raised in Hispanic 
circles.
As Antonia Hernandez, speaking for the Mexican 
American Legal Defense and Educational Fund before 
Representative Garcia's Subcommittee, remarked 
(December 9, 1982):
Employer sanctions won't work and will 
discriminate . . .
The ID system: I am reminded that during Father 
Hersberg's [sic] testimony in favor of H.R. 7357, 
he said there was nothing discriminatory with an ID 
system. He used an example I would like to restate 
here. He carries ID cards, the American Express 
and as Chairman of the Board of Chase Manhattan
U.S. Immigration Policy 119
Bank. Those cards are symbols of prestige, of 
status.
The ID system, any ID system to [the Hispanic] 
community will carry a badge of inferiority, a 
badge that we, each and every one of us will have to 
carry. We will not be able to show our American 
Express. We will not be able to show our American 
passport, or that we are on the board of a Fortune 
500 company.
To the members of the Hispanic community, the 
employer sanctions and the ID will be that badge of 
inferiority. We will have to prove who we are just 
because of the color of our skin and the accent in 
our speech.
I must confess that I have considerable sympathy for the 
Hispanic concerns. My first reaction was, of course, unsym 
pathetic since I tended to discount the possibility of 
discrimination that could follow the enactment of employer 
sanctions much as Father Hesburgh did. My views now are 
somewhat changed, for I cannot discount fears that are so 
widespread and obviously rooted in personal experiences of 
the Hispanic community. But, even if there were no other 
objections to their enactment, employer sanctions, and in 
deed amnesty, together define a set of policy instruments 
which are unlikely to achieve the intended objectives. In fact, 
they may lead to exactly the opposite results from those 
desired! Let me argue why.
The Simpson-Mazzoli approach, as stated, rested on two 
policy instruments: employer sanctions and an amnesty. 
Employer sanctions would make it illegal to hire un 
documented aliens. In eliminating the 1952 Texas proviso, 
the Bill in its conference committee version would have even 
imposed criminal penalties for persistent infractions. By
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"cutting off jobs" in the U.S, the Bill (and indeed the Select 
Commission before it) expected to eliminate the magnet that 
draws in the illegals and thus cripple their inflow. Coupled 
with the sanctions was, of course, the amnesty provision. 
While simultaneously expected to play the political role of 
lubricating Hispanic consent to the employer sanctions, its 
principal rationale was surely the rescue of the enormous 
backlog (or stock) of illegals from its underclass status. Be 
tween them, the sanctions and the amnesty would then 
eliminate the stock of illegals, cut deeply into their new in 
flow and thus achieve the desired twin objectives.
Ironically, however, these two policies are likely to in 
crease the illegal inflow, and therefore, shortly thereafter, 
the stock as well, whereas I am afraid that the underclass 
status may paradoxically worsen.
Simply put, the problem is that employer sanctions can be 
expected to be ineffective (quite consistent with the possibili 
ty that, as the Hispanic community fears, they will impact 
adversely on the civil rights of that community through 
discrimination in hiring), owing to reasons which are deeply 
rooted in our social, political and juridical traditions. At the 
same time, sanctions will draw resources away from border 
enforcement where the numbers that daily get past our 
border patrol are naturally affected somewhat by the level of 
enforcement. Thus, the net result could well be, paradoxical 
ly enough, an increase in the rate of illegal immigration! At 
the same time, by increasing the harassment at work, 
employer sanctions could well increase the sense of exposure 
and vulnerability characteristic of the underclass status.
The ineffectiveness of employer sanctions can be safely 
predicted. Self-interest alone can be expected to lead the 
employers to oppose the INS through lobbying and litiga 
tion, draining its budget and weakening effective enforce 
ment. Such a prospect also derives from the several, highly
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articulate and energetic lobbying groups of ethnic Americans 
who, as before this subcommittee, have in fact opposed 
employer sanctions strenuously. But if self-interest alone was 
involved in weakening the effectiveness of employer sanc 
tions, I would be less pessimistic than I am. As it happens, 
morality is the more critical factor and, in this instance, only 
weakens further the enforceability of sanctions. Our natural 
instincts make it hard to collaborate in efforts to seize and 
deport, no matter what we think of illegal immigration in the 
abstract. The critical factor is that we are dealing with 
human beings. As the Swiss novelist Max Frisch has remark 
ed of the guestworkers' experience in Western Europe: "we 
asked for workers but got men instead."
The intense moral dilemma posed by this fact is illustrated 
again and again in our experience with enforcing immigra 
tion laws. Thus, our courts have repeatedly (though not 
always) struck down discrimination against legal aliens, 
defining a civil rights tradition that is truly laudable and 
almost unique. But they have gone further and found in 
favor of even illegal aliens who, it has often been argued, 
have no locus standi in the first place in view of their illegal 
presence! Notable here are the celebrated Texas judgment in 
1980 by Federal Judge Woodrow Seals who upheld the rights 
of illegal aliens' children to public education, and the 1984 
Supreme Court ruling that illegal aliens are entitled to the 
protection of federal labor laws. A Corpus Christi, Texas 
jury initially acquitted Jack Elder on charges of illegally 
transporting aliens into the U.S. although he was later con 
victed in a federal court. Mr. Elder's defense was simply a 
moral one, i.e., that he and his associate Roman Catholic lay 
workers were offering sanctuary to Salvadorans fleeing 
political persecution! 6
Yet again, it is remarkable that in the case of the Haitian 
boat people, when the administration reacted to their arrival
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by unprecedented incarceration, it was not long before civil 
rights groups took up their cause, resulting in some relief and 
protracted legal proceedings awaiting resolution. Therefore, 
I would argue that the much discussed finding of the GAO 
that employer sanctions have not been particularly effective 
elsewhere, 7 even though some countries such as France and 
Canada have chosen subsequently to increase their reliance 
on them, applies with unquestionable force in our case.
By contrast, enhanced border enforcement has resulted in 
increased interceptions. Between 1965 and 1970, the seized il 
legals tripled to well over 300,000 annually. In recent years, 
the numbers have approximated as much as a million. 
Doubtless, this reflects increased attempts at entry. But it 
would be ludicrous to suggest that stepped-up enforcement 
by the Border Patrol, now totaling over 2,500, has played no 
role. Even if every intercepted alien tries to get back in again 
(and indeed many must, if the million annual interceptions 
are to be reconciled with the scaled-down illegal stock 
estimates suggested earlier by me), the increased rate of ap 
prehension from more enforcement must affect in some 
degree the total numbers that successfully get through. The 
reduction in inflows, in this fashion, is not likely to be very 
substantial any more than India can hope to stem the tide of 
Bangladesh immigrant influx into Assam by building a fence 
and stepping up its enforcement along a massive, quasi-open 
border. But it is certainly likely to be greater than from 
employer sanctions, dollar for dollar.
As for the amnesty program, the other pillar of the 
Simpson-Mazzoli architecture, I am afraid that too is flaw 
ed. One can plausibly maintain that it could accelerate the in 
flux, magnifying the total size of the illegal immigrant 
population in the foreseeable future, while increasing their 
underclass status. Although the numbers who seek to come 
across are not sensitive to small changes in relative wages, 
the disparities between Mexico and the U.S. being so enor-
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mous, it is probable that a dramatic improvement in wages 
expected here could make a noticeable difference in the 
numbers that do wish to try to get past the border. Unfor 
tunately, from this viewpoint, an amnesty creates the prob 
lem that it translates an illegal status with a low associated 
wage into legal status with a distinct improvement in the 
wage earned, now and through subsequent upward mobility 
along the legal job ladder. Since, in economics and in public 
policy, bygones are rarely bygones, an amnesty now may 
well lead to the expectation of an amnesty again, in which 
case we would be encouraging more to attempt illegal entry. 
Then again, if Representative Garcia is right that the most 
liberal amnesty program that we can get through the House 
and enact into legislation will not legalize more than 25 per 
cent of the suspected undocumented population currently in 
the United States, we face the ironic outcome that the amnes 
ty will eventually lead to more illegal immigrants here than 
we rescued from that status. Caution about the small pro 
portion that will likely secure the benefit of the amnesty is in 
deed well-grounded in view of the numerous constraints that 
afflict eligibility and the associated problems that pertain 
thereto.
Is it not also likely that the INS will feel compelled, once 
an amnesty has been offered and implemented, to "go 
after" and harass more intensely those who remain illegal? 
Those not reborn may appear the more damnable! Greater 
internal enforcement, with or without employer sanctions, 
that will probably follow the completion of the amnesty pro 
gram, will only make the large numbers of present and arriv 
ing illegals more insecure, accentuating their underclass 
status and psychology.
A Different Approach
I propose therefore that we take an altogether different 
approach. In essence, we should greatly diminish internal en-
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for cement and correspondingly increase external enforce 
ment, i.e., at the border. As I have already stressed, border 
enforcement cannot greatly reduce, leave aside eliminate, the 
influx as long as we (quite correctly) seek to control the 
border in a way consistent with our moral sensibilities and 
traditions which preclude Soviet bloc-style techniques. I 
wish, of course, that we showed the same sensibilities where 
we extend economic aid and patrolling capabilities to a coun 
try which then is, in effect, "bribed" into taking into its own 
population, potential emigrants to our shores, the kind of 
morally offensive action that we ourselves would not take 
against them! Evidently, I have in mind our relationship with 
Haiti in this regard. But, despite our morally constrained 
techniques of border enforcement, such enforcement will 
doubtless have some impact.
Besides, border enforcement would be sufficiently visible 
to satisfy those who feel that we should be "doing more" to 
regain control of our border. In public policy, the advantage 
of such visible, symbolic action is much too understated. 
Where a problem is not capable of total solution, such action 
acquires great importance. Thus, while I believe that the late 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's decision to construct a fence 
along the enormous India-Bangladesh border in the State of 
Assam was an ineffective policy, and (before the Indian 
government suspended the construction owing to 
Bangladesh governmental protests) I had a bet with the then 
Governor of Assam that it would only be a matter of weeks 
before the fence would be selling inch by inch in the bazaars 
of Dacca in Bangladesh, I believe that it was nonetheless a 
splendid policy. For, to be seen to be doing nothing at all, 
even though one could not really close the border, would 
have been politically explosive since it would have been read 
as indifference or indecisiveness. And building the fence was 
the least disruptive way of doing nothing while appearing to 
be doing something!
U.S. Immigration Policy 125
In our instance, enhanced border enforcement will indeed 
produce some tangible result, for reasons I have spelled out. 
But it needs to be supplemented by what I believe is a more 
effective policy, which is indeed the "price" counterpart of 
the enforcement policy. It is also a policy which builds up 
over the long haul when the more alarming scenarios of 
stepped-up attempts at entry might be more relevant. This is 
the active encouragement of the creation of an "economic 
fence" at the border, by promoting investments and 
economic activity along the long border. This "economic 
fence" can then act as an incentive to step off the escalator 
to the United States hinterland. We need to explore actively, 
keeping the government of Mexico informed and in con 
sultation, the creation of such an economic fence, envisaging 
something like the counterpart of "free trade zones" around 
the world. The economic fence would instead be a "free 
mobility zone" with investment benefits that attract the 
economic activity that would constitute the fence-principle 
that I envisage. 8
As we shift our attention to the border to regulate the in 
flux of immigrants, I would simultaneously downgrade in 
ternal enforcement. 9 This would include dropping the idea of 
employer sanctions. It would also mean going easy on INS 
enforcement, much as we did during the last census count. A 
de facto policy posture of this kind, which preserves the im 
portant distinction between legality and illegality while not 
seeking to divide the population energetically into the two 
categories through INS activity, would substantially reduce 
the unease of the illegal aliens that makes their exploitation 
rather easier.
This mix of policies, which puts the focus of immigration 
control and reform back at the border, offers the prospect 
therefore of getting as close to our two central and popular 
objectives as is possible. Mainly it requires executive action
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to reduce INS enforcement at home (an art, I might remark, 
the administration has practiced successfully with some 
other agencies), legislative action to increase the border en 
forcement budget substantially, and an active encourage 
ment of the "free mobility zone" program I have suggested.
NOTES
1. See also my opinion editorial article, "Control Immigration at the 
Border," Wall Street Journal, February 1,1985 and my testimony before 
Congressman Garcia at the Subcommittee on Census and Population, 
House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on March 26, 1985.
2. James Fallows, Washington editor of The Atlantic, has been par 
ticularly concerned with this aspect of the immigration question. See also 
his testimony before Congressman Garcia on March 26, 1985, op. cit.
3. This issue has surfaced with greater urgency in public perception 
recently, as the collapse in oil prices and the accentuation of the debt 
crisis in Mexico since January 1986 have been accompanied by a reported 
surge in the number of apprehensions of illegals attempting to cross the 
border. Thus, the New York Times (February 21, 1986, pp. Al and A15) 
reports: "The Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Ser 
vice warned today that, there has been a 'startling' surge of illegal aliens 
entering the United States from Mexico in recent months. 'We are seeing 
the greatest surge of people in history across our Southern border,' Com 
missioner Alan C. Nelson said at a news conference called to renew the 
agency's appeal for tougher immigration laws." In turn, the New York 
Times (February 24, 1986) renewed its call to the President to support the 
passage of the immigration bills before Congress, especially the employer 
sanctions which I discuss and reject below.
4. See, in particular, the study by the staff of the Bureau of the Census 
for the Select Commission, conducted by Messrs. Siegel, Passel and 
Robinson, and included in Appendix E of the Commission's Final 
Report.
5. Two observations are pertinent. Where we insist on treating im 
migrants, legal and illegal, on a par with natives, the "cost" of immigra 
tion rises relative to potential benefits. Insofar, therefore, as we reject 
immigrants on the ground that their immigration is harmful to us, there
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is a moral-philosophical dilemma here: by insisting on equality of treat 
ment if we admit them, we reject their entry and thus force them to live 
abroad in yet greater destitution (but safely distant from our view)! Next, 
our aversion to treating immigrants differentially from natives itself may 
be consonant with the way, psycho-culturally, U.S. society treats 
adopted children on a par with natural children. Perhaps it is not surpris 
ing that Japan, where adoption is relatively infrequent and confined 
generally within relatives (as in the classic case of the novelist Soseki Nat- 
sume), the attitudes towards immigrants, whose entry is severely 
restricted, is not exemplary whereas the United States exhibits the op 
posite pattern in both dimensions.
6. As of going to press, the question of sanctuary is still in the courts, 
arousing intense passions of the kind which I believe to be precisely what 
would undermine the efficacy of attempts at enforcing sanctions.
7. In August 1982, the GAO released their report: Information on the 
Enforcement of Laws Regarding Employment of Aliens in Selected 
Countries. The study was conducted at the request of the Senate Sub 
committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Committee on the 
Judiciary. Based on questionnaire replies by 20 countries and visits to 
four (Canada, Germany, France and Switzerland), these latter all having 
some form of employer sanctions, the GAO study found that the sanc 
tions were generally ineffective for reasons including the facts that judges 
were generally too lenient, regarding illegal employment as not a 
"serious offense." This underlines exactly the point that I am making in 
this lecture. See also the statement by William Anderson, director, 
General Government Division before the Subcommittee on Census and 
Population, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, on The 
Demographic Impact of Immigration on the United States, in the 
presence of Congressman Garcia, on March 26, 1985.
8. Such an economic fence on the Mexican side would have the advan 
tage that one could legally pay wages lower than the U.S. minimum wage 
but higher than in Mexico, and thus hold illegals back from attempting 
entry since slightly lower wages would be traded off against legality and 
Mexican residence in contrast to residence in U.S. as an underclass.
9. The irrational fascination with internal enforcement (perhaps also a 
puritanical reaction against those "aiding and abetting" in the violation 
of our "sovereign borders" and defense thereof) in preference to border 
enforcement is apparent also in other areas, e.g., narcotics traffic. 
William Safire recently wrote in the New York Times (February 26,
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1986): "The most glaring difficulty in our war on drugs is that we have 
all but abandoned the front line: the border is relatively undefended. The 
classic bureaucratic battle between the Justice Department, which 
believes in tips by informants and criminal prosecutions, and the 
Customs Service of the Treasury Department, which tries to interdict 
drugs at our borders, has been won by Justice."
